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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5483
This paper estimates the relationship between initial 
village inequality and subsequent household income 
growth for a large sample of households in rural China. 
Using a rich longitudinal survey spanning the years 
1987–2002, and controlling for an array of household 
and village characteristics, the paper finds that households 
located in higher inequality villages experienced 
significantly lower income growth through the 1990s. 
However, local inequality’s predictive power and effects 
are significantly diminished by the end of the sample. 
The paper exploits several advantages of the household-
level data to explore hypotheses that shed light on the 
This paper—a product of the Human Development and Public Services Team, Development Research Group—is part 
of a larger effort in the department to understand the relationship between inequality and economic performance. Policy 
Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at   
jgiles@worldbank.org.  
channels by which inequality affects growth. Biases due 
to aggregation and heterogeneity of returns to own-
resources, previously suggested as candidate explanations 
for the relationship, are both ruled out. Instead, the 
evidence points to unobserved village institutions at 
the time of economic reforms that were associated with 
household access to higher income activities as the source 
of the link between inequality and growth. The empirical 
analysis addresses a number of pertinent econometric 
issues including measurement error and attrition, but 
underscores others that are likely to be intractable for all 
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1.0  Introduction 
For researchers estimating the effect of inequality on growth, China would seem a promising 
“laboratory.”  Since the start of economic reform in the early 1980s, it experienced plenty of both:  Per 
capita income has grown nearly 8 percent annually, while the Gini coefficient rose from 0.28 to 0.39 
(Ravallion and Chen, 2007). There was also significant within-China variation in growth and inequality at 
the  local  level  (Benjamin,  Brandt,  and  Giles  2005).  Experience  with  cross-country  aggregate  data, 
however, d e m o n s t r a t e s  t h a t  e s t i m a t i n g  a  r o b u s t  c o r r e l a t i o n ,  l e t  a l o n e  a  c a u s a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  
inequality and growth, faces major empirical challenges, some of which stem from less than ideal data.
1 
Better data alone, however, cannot solve the causality problem. Kuznets (1955) suggests the opposite 
chain of causality, from growth to changes in the income distribution; and almost certainly, unobserved 
heterogeneity is a potential factor, with inequality reflecting other factors that drive growth.  Finally, even 
if we can estimate a “reduced form” effect of inequality on growth, it may still be impossible to identify 
the channels through which it matters. 
In  this  paper  we  use  the  post-reform  experience  of  rural  China  to  determine  whether  local 
inequality impeded the growth of household incomes. We are able to address some of the methodological 
problems that plague cross-country data. By using a repeated, consistently applied household survey we 
avoid some of the measurement problems endemic in the cross-country setting. At least compared to 
international variation, the relative similarity of local institutions across villages in China also permits a 
cleaner isolation of the impact of inequality from other unobserved factors. At the same time, there are 
sufficient s p a t i a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  i n s t i t u t i o n s  a n d  i n e q u a l i t y  t h a t  e xploring  the  experiences  of  rural 
households  scattered  across  villages  can  inform  us a b o u t  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  c h a n n e l s  b y  w h i c h  i n e q u a l i t y  
affects income growth.  In particular, we can distinguish between two broad classes of explanations that 
have been offered as to why inequality affects growth: imperfect factor markets, including credit, or 
growth-inhibiting institutions. 
The foundation of this paper is a rich panel that tracks household incomes from early in the 
reform period (1987) to nearly the present (2002). The data allow us to link the detailed trajectories of 
household income to initial village and household conditions. Our question is simple: Controlling for a 
rich set of covariates, did higher village inequality dampen household income growth? There are several 
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1 The potential problems are numerous: cross-country heterogeneity of data and measurement standards, problems of 
aggregation,  measurement  error  of  key  variables,  short  time-series’  of  inequality  and  growth,  and  less-than-
comparable estimates of inequality.  
Inequality and Growth in Rural China, Page 2 
advantages to using household-level data.
2 Most importantly, we can control for a host of household-level 
variables–notably  flexible  functions  of  initial  household  income–that  may  be  confounded  with  local 
inequality.  This  helps  rule  out  some  potential  explanations  for  the  inequality-growth  relationship,  in 
particular those that rely on the aggregation of non-linear effects of own-income. With household-level 
data we are also able to explore “within-village” heterogeneity of the impact of inequality on growth: Are 
the poor hurt more than the rich?  Are households with higher educated members immune to the impact? 
We are also able to broaden the set of outcomes from “income growth” to other economic variables, like 
the composition of income, e.g., concentration in agriculture, or participation in off-farm employment, 
that inform the question of how inequality may affect growth.  
Repeated observations at the village-level allow us to evaluate the stability and consistency of the 
“treatment” of higher inequality: We examine whether all variation in inequality is the same. First, we 
explore the impact of cross-sectional differences of initial inequality across villages. We then determine 
whether rising inequality within villages, or changing inequality across villages, affects household growth 
in the same way. These multiple sources of “treatment” provide identifying information on the nature of 
any causal relationship between inequality and growth. The village-dimension of the panel also allows us 
to address whether unobserved heterogeneity confounds the impact of initial inequality. 
While we are able to provide robust estimates of the correlation between village inequality at the 
outset of reforms and subsequent growth, there remain disheartening limits as to what we can learn from 
even these data. Paramount among these limits, the endogeniety problem is intractable: Solving it requires 
finding instruments that predict initial income inequality, but are otherwise excludable from a growth 
equation,  and  in  particular  are u n c o r r e l a t ed  with  any i n s t i t u t i o n s  that  may  be  related  to  subsequent 
growth.  The next best thing is to trace the correlation of income inequality through various observable 
institutional channels that affect growth. While we previously attempted this (Benjamin, Brandt, and 
Giles, 2006), we were unable to find any robust linkages between inequality and measured institutions at 
the outset of reforms. Again, this problem is thorny to solve, as initial inequality in a village in 1987 will 
reflect not just the immediate institutional structure of the reform period, but the entire history of the 
village throughout the occasionally tumultuous post-1949 period, e.g. land reform, collectivization, the 
Great  Leap  Forward,  the  Cultural  Revolution,  as  well  as  its  pre-1949  socio-economic  structures. 
Moreover, “village” inequality will reflect “local” conditions beyond the village, at the township and even 
county-level, making it difficult to pin down the precise institutional mechanism.  
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2 Ferreira (2010), among others, has highlighted the importance of using micro-level data to shed light on those 
mechanisms  driving  the  growth-inequality  relationship  that c a n n o t  b e  a d d r e s s ed  by  the  cross-country 
macroeconomics literature.  
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Despite these limitations we are able to establish robust patterns in the data that are suggestive of 
the channels by which inequality operates – and which it does not. First, we find that initial inequality has 
a robust negative effect on household income growth that is impossible to dismiss. Second, the effect of 
inequality fades over time: As villages became more integrated with the wider economy, the influences of 
initial  conditions  on  trajectories  were “ s w a m p e d ”  b y  r a p i d l y  e x p a n d i n g  e x t e r n a l  o p p o r t u n i t i e s ,  and 
possibly local institutional change. Third, we find that only inequality from the very beginning (1987) 
matters,  at  least  for  the  15-year  period  that  we  observe.  There  is  no  evidence  that  generally  rising 
inequality, or changes of inequality across villages, have an impact on household income growth. Fourth, 
we find that education and access to off-farm opportunities play a critical role in this relationship: Better-
educated individuals are less affected by the adverse impact of inequality, and households in more equal 
villages  are  better  able  to  move  into  off-farm  wage  employment.  Fifth,  setting  aside  its  link  with 
education, we find that high inequality is an “equal opportunity” growth inhibitor: rich and poor alike in 
high inequality villages suffer a growth penalty.  
Overall, we interpret our results as suggesting that the effect of inequality reflects something 
fundamental about the economic and institutional characteristics of villages at the outset of reforms that 
shaped economic opportunity for all households.  Credit market stories that we expect to be reflected in 
differences across household income strata, or in the effect of changes in inequality on growth over time, 
seem much less likely. At least in the Chinese context, institution-based hypotheses linking inequality to 
growth are most relevant.   
We begin with a brief review of the reasons why inequality is believed to affect growth, and why 
these factors are relevant in rural China. Next, we provide a formal overview of our empirical framework, 
highlighting two main issues. First, we discuss the identification problem, underscoring the difficulty of 
finding naturally occurring variation that could ever substitute for a proper experiment. There are other 
empirical  problems,  however,  that  we  can a d d r e s s ,  i n c l u d i n g  p a n e l -attrition,  aggregation,  and 
measurement error. Second, we provide a detailed explanation of the links between our household-level 
specification and the aggregate-level regression commonly employed in the literature. After describing 
the data, we present our core empirical results: estimates of the effect of village inequality on household 
income growth, and how this evolves over time. As part of this exercise, we line up the household and 
village-level evidence. We then explore dimensions of the heterogeneity in the response of household 
growth to inequality, focusing on education, household age, and initial household income. The third set of 
results concerns the impact of inequality on the evolution of village economic structure, and household 
participation in agriculture, wage labor, and family businesses. Our last set of results addresses issues of 
dynamics, where we exploit the co-evolution of inequality and growth at the village-level to estimate a 
series of panel-data specifications that underscore the difficulty of drawing strong conclusions about the  
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general relationship between inequality and growth, from these, and almost certainly other data sets. The 
final section draws together our conclusions.  
 
2.0  Why Might Village Inequality Affect Growth? 
There are three conventional classes of explanation: imperfect credit markets, imperfect factor 
markets, and political economy.
3 In the first class of explanations, credit market constraints tie the ability 
of households to exploit opportunities for growth to their own resources. As the poorest of households 
have the fewest resources, holding average village incomes fixed, unequal villages have more resource-
constrained  households.  If  credit  markets  are  fully  developed,  the  relationship  breaks  down,  as  the 
distribution of own resources no longer determines the distribution of household growth rates. A second 
possible channel is through factor markets. Higher income inequality (or inequality of land, human, or 
physical capital) may be associated with imperfect competition or other impediments to factor market 
development that limit opportunities for trade, especially for the poor.
4 
The most common channel in the cross-country literature, however, implies the mechanism is 
through local political economy: unequal communities make different collective choices that affect the 
growth potential of households. For example, high-inequality communities may adopt more progressive 
tax structures, as low-income households pressure for redistribution in ways that inhibit growth. This is 
the  conventional  taxation-based  story  offered  by  Alesina  and  Rodrik  (1994),  Benabou  (1996),  and 
Persson  and  Tabellini  (1994).  Alternatively,  the  greater  homogeneity  (equality)  of  households  may 
facilitate consensus for more efficient tax systems, and higher investment in public goods and services.
5 
Localities a l s o  p l a y  a n  i m p o r t a n t  r o l e  i n  t a r g e t i n g  a s s i s t a n c e  t o  t h e  p o o r ,  a n d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  e v i d e n c e  
suggests that there may be greater leakage, and thus poorer targeting in more unequal communities.
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3 S e e  A g h i o n ,  C a r o l i ,  a n d  G a r c i a -Penalosaand  (1999),  Lloyd-Elllis  (2003),  and  Perotti  (1996)  for  excellent 
summaries of the cross-country inequality and growth literature, with detailed discussions of the theoretical linkages 
between inequality and growth. 
4 Notable examples include: Galor and Zeira (1993), Besley and Burgess (2000), Banerjee, et al (2001), Banerjee, 
Gertler, and Ghatak (2002), Galor and Moav (2004), Banerjee and Iyer (2005), and Besley et al (2010). 
5 Several papers suggest that collective action and provision of public goods may be complicated by high levels of 
inequality within communities. See for example, Alesina and La Ferrara (2000), Bardhan, Ghatak and Karaivanov 
(2007), Dayton-Johnson (2000), Araujo, et al (2008), and Khwaja (2009). With respect to public finance, Sokoloff 
and Zolt (2005) find that high inequality is correlated with more regressive taxes, and less funding of local public 
investments and services. Glaeser (2006) reviews evidence suggesting that unequal societies are less likely to have 
governments that respect property rights. Acemoglu, et al (2008) show that in the case of Columbia, it was political, 
not economic (land) inequality that adversely affected long run outcomes, further reinforcing the importance of this 
class of explanations. 
6 See, for example, Baird et al (2009), Bardhan et al (2008), Galasso and Ravallion (2005), Shankar et al (2010).  
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There may also be strong links between the distribution of income, levels of education, and the provision 
of public education.
7 
To what extent can we expect any of these factors to be important at the village, or local, level in 
rural China? In principle, all three could have been important. At the outset of reforms, formal sources of 
credits were limited in Chinese villages. Factor markets were also poorly developed. Land for farming, 
for example, was allocated administratively, with limited opportunities for either land rental or the hiring 
of labor among households (Benjamin and Brandt, 2002). Migration to the cities, and even other villages, 
was restricted by the household registration, or hukou, system.  Last, from the perspective of political 
economy explanations, the village was administratively important.
8 Over the period we examine, village 
governments controlled policy levers that could affect household incomes: They oversaw the allocation of 
land use rights for cultivated land to households as part of the Household Responsibility System (HRS), 
and exercised control over the allocation and management of other collective assets such as forestry and 
village-run enterprises.
9 They also had taxing authority, and until the 2002 Tax-for-Fee Reform, were the 
most important provider of local public goods, including primary education, agricultural infrastructure 
and  health  care.
10 F i n a l l y ,  v i l l a g e  l e a d e r s  p l a y e d  a n  i m p o r t a n t  r o l e  i n  t a r geting  poor  households  for 
assistance.
11  With  individual  and  household  geographic  mobility  severely  limited,  household  income 
opportunities were heavily shaped by local policy. And in this context, inequality at the village level may 
have had an effect on the evolution of household incomes through village policy.  Inequality at the village 
level was also likely correlated with governance structures at the township and county level that mattered 
more broadly for economic policy.
12 
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7 See, for example, Benabou (1996) or Lloyd-Ellis (2000). This channel may be especially important if there are 
externalities associated with the distribution of education in the economy (e.g., Acemoglu (1996)). Note that, as in 
Galor, Moav, and Vollrath (2009), imperfect credit markets and political economy channels may interact to give rise 
to underinvestment in human capital. 
8  Villages  are  at  the  lowest  rung  of  the  rural  administrative  hierarchy.  Above  villages,  township  and  county 
governments have authority over some fees and taxes, and above the county lies the provincial government. The 
Village Organic Law of 1988 formally recognized village “self-government.” 
9 Early in the reform process it was likely that inequality was heavily influenced by how collectivization proceeded. 
The allocation of use-rights of land to households was complete by 1983. By all indications, the distribution of 
cultivated land was fairly egalitarian. Reports suggest, however, that this was much less the case with respect to the 
allocation and sale of other collective assets. 
10 See Zhang, Yan, Brandt, and Rozelle (2005), and Fan, Zhang, and Zhang (2004). Jalan and Ravallion (2002) 
show that local levels of income, and associated public investments (e.g. roads and health care) are positively related 
to  household  consumption  growth,  and  help  explain t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  “ g e o g r a p h i c  p o v e r t y  t r a p s , ”  w h e r e b y  
households in poorer areas of rural China experience lower growth than those in richer areas. 
11 Over the period covered by this panel, this has included assistance through wu baohu programs for those unable to 
work and employment in food for work programs (Park, Wang, and Wu, 2002). 
12  Those  localities  in  which  local  cadre  were  able  to  capture  the  rents  associated  with  de-collectivization,  for 
example, were often those in which off-farm activity was effectively discouraged through excessive taxation by 
village, township and county governments (Oi, 1989).  
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Thus, a case can be made that differences in local economic conditions and village institutions 
paralleled  some  of  those  across  countries,  including  along  dimensions  believed  to  link  inequality  to 
growth. Over time, however, Chinese villages have become less isolated, and access to new markets and 
opportunities, e.g. through migration, has expanded. Factors that were key determinants of income and 
institutions in the 1980s may be less important now. Governance reforms such as those associated with 
the implementation of the Village Organic Law may have also narrowed some institutional differences 
across villages (Martinez-Bravo et al, 2010). These dynamics themselves may be informative about the 
processes linking inequality and growth.  
 
3.0  Empirical Framework 
3.1  Inequality and Growth at the Household-Level 
Our core analysis is based on the household-level specification: 
 
gi,vT ≡ lnyi,vT −lnyi,vt−1 =α0 +α1lnyi,vt−1 +α2lny 
vt−1(i) +αvIQ 
vt−1(i) + ′ γ Xi,vt−1 + ′ β Xvt−1 +ui,vT
	 ﾠ
(1)	 ﾠ
where  gi,vT  is the (average) growth rate of per capita income for household i in village v between the 
initial period,    t −1, and the terminal period, T. This is a structural model relating household growth to 
own-household initial resources,  lnyi,vt−1, and the distribution of resources across other households in the 
village. We summarize two dimensions of this distribution by the mean log incomes of other households 
besides  household  i, 
 lny 
vt−1(i),  and  the  level  of  inequality  (i.e.,  the  Gini  coefficient)  among  other 
households,  IQ 
vt−1(i). For notational convenience we use a “tilde” to denote a statistic calculated over all 
village households, excluding household i.  We also include controls for both household and village-level 
covariates from the initial period,  Xi,vt−1 and  Xvt−1. 
Equation  (1)  has  several  inherent  advantages  over  previous  specifications.  Most  importantly, 
compared to typical specifications based on aggregate data, we are better able to distinguish among the 
competing  explanations  for  the  growth-inequality  relationship.  The  inclusion  of  household-level 
covariates, notably flexible controls for initial household income, i.e., polynomials of  lnyi,vt−1, helps to 
minimize the influence of potentially omitted non-linearities of own-income, and reduces the possibility 
that inequality reflects the spurious effects of aggregation. Use of the “leave-one-out,” or jackknifed 
inequality index also better highlights the nature of the “treatment” we wish to isolate: the purely external 
effect of inequality.   
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Imagine a Chinese “Robin Hood” stealing from a rich family, and giving to a poor one, while 
leaving  household  i u n t o u c h e d .
13 T h i s  r e d u c e s  o v e r a l l  i n e q u a l i t y ,  w i t h o u t  c h a n g i n g  a v e r a g e  v i l l a g e  
income,  or  the  income  of  household  i.  Why  might  this  redistribution  affect  the  growth  trajectory  of 
household i? If imperfect credit markets are the only source of the inequality-growth relationship, then in 
the  household-level  specification 
 IQ 
vt−1(i)  should  not  be  significant b e c a u s e  w e  a r e  c o n t r o l l i n g  f o r 
household  own-resources.  Under  the  credit-market  explanation,  the  distribution  of  household  income 
among  one’s  neighbors  has  no  independent  effect  on  a  household’s  own-growth.  Indeed,  the  credit-
market explanation is only relevant for the aggregate (village-level) specification. As noted by Deaton 
(2003) in the context of inequality and health, and Ravallion (1998) for inequality and growth at the 
county-level in China, some of the key reasons why inequality might be correlated with average outcomes 
are pure artifacts of aggregation: inequality is a proxy for heterogeneity of household resources, or returns 
to resources, that are captured at the aggregate-level. Estimation at the household-level therefore allows 
us directly to determine whether village inequality has an external effect on household growth. If it does, 
this  provides  strong  evidence  that  factors  besides  imperfect  credit  markets  are  the  source  of  the 
relationship. If we also control for own household endowments of land, human capital and labor, we 
reduce the chance that imperfect factor markets drive the inequality-growth relationship. A significant 
effect  of 
 IQ 
vt−1(i) w i l l  t h e r e f o r e  p o i n t  t o w a r d s  t h e  p o l itical  economy,  or  institution-based  class  of 
explanations. 
Another benefit of the household-level specification is that it enables us to explore heterogeneity 
in the response of growth to income inequality. This exercise may inform us as to the mechanism by 
which inequality affects household income growth. For example, if inequality hurts the poor more than 
the rich, one interpretation is that own-resources mitigate the adverse impact of inequality, consistent with 
a model of imperfect credit markets. Of course, political economy models can also generate the prediction 
that the rich are less harmed by institutional failure than the poor, especially if the institutional failure is 
self-serving.  On  the  other  hand,  a  general  failure  to  provide  growth-enhancing  public  goods,  or  the 
imposition of taxes that discourages a shift to non-agricultural pursuits, might affect all village residents 
similarly.  If  inequality  affects  everyone  similarly,  the  public-good  oriented  explanations  seem  more 
plausible than the credit-market models. 
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13 One candidate for “Chinese Robin Hood” is Song Jiang (૙ߐ) and the 108 bandits from Mount Liang (ྊࢁ) who 
feature in the Chinese literary classic The Water Margin (ਫ浒传) (Shi and Luo, 1365c). The Water Margin is also 
known under the following alternative English titles as All Men are Brothers (Buck, 1933), Outlaws of the Marsh 
(Shapiro, 1981), and The 108 Heroes.  
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3.2  Econometric Issues: Endogeneity 
  In  order  to  make  Equation  (1)  operational,  we  provide  more  details  of  the  estimation,  and 
evaluate the statistical assumptions required to draw causal inferences concerning the impact of  IQ 
vt−1(i) 
on growth. Note first one seemingly minor departure in (1) from the usual aggregate-level specification: 
the village mean income is the average of log household per capita incomes, not the log of average 
household  per  capita  incomes.  This  distinction  becomes  important  in  aggregation,  and  linking  the 
household parameter αv to the village-level coefficient on inequality. We also need to specify an index of 
income inequality,  IQvt−1. Typically, researchers employ the Gini coefficient, and for comparability we 
also report results with the Gini. However, our main index of inequality is the “Mean Log Deviation,” 
which is defined as  MLDvt−1 = lnyvt−1 − lnyvt−1, the difference between the log of mean income, and the 
mean of log income. This is the same measure as used by Ravallion (1998) in his exploration of the 
consequences of aggregation in estimating the growth-inequality relationship.
14 We use this measure of 
inequality because it is highly convenient for aggregating from the household to the village-level results, 
and for addressing other statistical issues. We note, however, that the empirical results are not sensitive to 
the choice of inequality measure.  
There are at least three classes of econometric issues that need to be addressed. The first two are a 
consequence of less than perfect data, and the third of the non-randomization of inequality: 
Measurement  Error.  There  are  several  ways  for  measurement  error,  especially  of  household 
income, to generate spurious links between initial inequality and subsequent growth. For example, we 
might  poorly  control  for  own-initial  income.  Village  summary  statistics,  like  inequality,  which  are 
correlated with own-household income, may then pick-up some of the effect of own-income on growth. 
To some extent, this is mitigated  by  our  use  of t he j ackknifed 
 IQ 
vt−1(i) t hat  excl udes own-household 
income. Indeed, use of the jackknifed  IQ 
vt−1(i) breaks potential mechanical and small-sample bias links 
between the village-level statistics and household i outcomes, and helps address some of the measurement 
error that arises from using group means as regressors. In Appendix 1 we show that Equation (1) is part of 
the reduced-form for Deaton’s suggested estimator for correcting measurement error with group means. 
Furthermore, we include a rich set of household-level covariates, such as household endowments of land, 
labor, and human capital, that should reduce the extent to which the error term contains mis-measured 
household-level  “growth  potential”  correlated  with 
 IQ 
vt−1(i).  More  conventionally,  however,  mis-
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14 Our specification departs from Ravallion (1998) in two key ways. First, we use the “leave-one-out” version of the 
inequality index, 
 MLD vt−1(i) = lny 
vt−1(i) − lny 
vt−1(i) . Second, we use the mean of log incomes, not the log of mean 
incomes, as our control for the “level” of village income (our measure of this is also jackknifed).  
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measurement of household income may simply contaminate our estimate of initial inequality  IQ 
vt−1(i). For 
example,  “outlier”  households  may  generate  a  high-level  of  apparent  inequality  combined  with  high 
initial  income.  With  mean-reversion  of  household  incomes,  such  villages  will  appear  to  have  lower 
growth rates, even if there is no link between inequality and growth. Alternatively, the greater degree of 
noise in  IQ 
vt−1(i) may result in conventional attenuation bias. In principle, this type of measurement error 
is  relatively  straightforward  to  address  with  instrumental  variables.  The  most  obvious  candidate 
instrument for  IQ 
vt−1(i) is an alternative measure of inequality that is robust to outliers and measurement 
error. We use the 90-10 ratio for this purpose, jackknifed in the same way as other village-level variables, 
 RAT vt−1(i) =  yvt−1(i)
90  yvt−1(i)
10 . 
Attrition. Our best estimates of village-level initial conditions are based on the largest sample of 
households surveyed in 1987, which because of attrition is significantly larger than the balanced panel of 
households observed continuously between 1987 and 2002. The attrition rate is about 30 percent over the 
15  years.  While  this  hurts  the  sample  size,  our  greater  concern  is  that  household  attrition  may  be 
correlated with both initial inequality and subsequent growth. For example, there may be selective out-
migration, with households more likely to leave slow-growing villages. The key question is whether such 
migration is correlated with initial inequality. If out-migration was more common in the high-inequality, 
low-growth potential villages, then depending on which households leave, we might observe a spurious 
link between initial inequality and the growth rates calculated on the basis of the initial sample collected 
in 1987, and the revised (attrition-affected) sample in 2002. In our empirical work, we explore the issue of 
attrition in detail, and ultimately present our main results adopting the “Inverse Probability Weighting” 
procedure recommended by Wooldridge (2002). 
Omitted Variables Bias. Our greatest concern is that even measured perfectly,  IQ 
vt−1(i) may be 
correlated with a village-level unobservable component of 
   
ui,vT , which we denote as θvt−1 . No matter how 
many covariates we include to control for initial conditions, there would always be the suspicion that 
inclusion of a better proxy for  θvt−1 could eliminate the apparent impact of inequality (e.g., see Kanbur 
(2005) for a summary). Perhaps the initial income distribution is related to policies in place at t - 1 that 
affect future growth?  What characteristic of θvt−1 might be of particular concern? Suppose that θvt−1 is a 
long-standing village taste, or predisposition, for low inequality. This is of concern only if  θvt−1 is also 
related to growth, for example, if egalitarian villages are more likely to invest in growth-enhancing public 
goods  like  schools,  or  to  keep  growth-distorting  taxation  to  a  minimum.  From  an  interpretation 
standpoint, if  θvt−1 drives the inequality-growth relationship, then our conclusions will only be accurate 
from an “historical” descriptive perspective: unequal villages in our sample grew more slowly. If it is the  
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underlying taste for low inequality (θvt−1) that drives growth, then a Robin Hood “intervention” would not 
affect the growth trajectory: Controlling for  θvt−1, the “treatment” of lower inequality would have no 
impact on growth. Rising inequality, similarly, would be of no consequence to growth. So while we could 
confidently conclude that low inequality villages historically grew faster, if unobserved “egalitarianism” 
was  the  driving  force,  we  could  not  draw  conclusions  concerning  the  present-day  increase  in  rural 
inequality. Ideally, we need to disentangle the impact of actual inequality from unobserved “tastes” for 
low inequality. 
One way to accomplish this is to find instruments that help predict initial inequality, but are 
independent of  θvt−1. In Benjamin, Brandt, and Giles (2006), we attempted such a strategy, using as 
instruments the asset distribution in period t - 1, especially the initial distribution of land. However, it is 
very difficult to plausibly claim that the land distribution is independent of θvt−1, as one expects that a 
taste for egalitiarianism, for example, also spills over to the land distribution, which was under significant 
control of the village government, and thus likely a function of θvt−1. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine any 
set of instruments succeeding.
15 Moreover, even if we could find correlates of initial inequality that are 
independent of θvt−1, it is hard to rule out just about any variable as potentially contributing to household 
growth (i.e., being related to household own-resources), and thus violating the exclusion restriction. 
In  the  end,  we  do  not  attempt  to  find  such  instruments,  but  choose  instead  to  live  with  the 
important qualification that initial income inequality may be correlated with other factors at the village-
level ( o r  p o s s i b l y  t h e  t o w n s h i p  o r  c o u n t y -level).  Indeed,  the  interpretation  of  inequality  as  causally 
determining institutional development, and thus growth, is predicated on such a correlation. While there 
are assumptions under which inequality alone can be interpreted purely causally, at the very least, we can 
determine whether high inequality is a “marker” or predictor of low growth potential. Besides including 
as many covariates as possible, another way to address the unobserved heterogeneity problem is to treat 
θvt−1 a s  a  f i x e d  e f f e c t ,  u s i n g  r e p e a t e d  o b s e r v a t i o n s  o f  v i l l a g e  i n e q u a l i t y  a n d  g r o w t h  t o  i m p l e m e n t  a  
village-panel based estimation procedure. We conduct this exercise, but note at the outset that it is subject 
to important, and well-recognized limitations. 
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15 Several papers have tried to follow-up on the insights of Engermann and Sokoloff (1997) that the distribution of 
factor endowments, especially land, may drive subsequent institutional development, inequality and growth. See, for 
example,  Easterly  (2007)  and  Galor,  Omer,  and  Vollrath  (2009).  Lundberg  and  Squire  (2003)  also  use  the 
distribution of land as an instrument for inequality in a growth-inequality specification. As noted by several authors, 
however (e.g., Chong and Gradstein (2007a)), inequality (of income and productive assets) and institutions probably 
co-evolve, mutually affecting each other in various ways. It is almost impossible to imagine how one could be taken 
as exogenous relative to the other.  
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3.3  A Note on Aggregation 
For comparability with the previous literature, and to serve as a foundation for the village-panel 
estimation, we also show results for the village analog of (1) (setting aside the jackknife dimension): 
   
gvT = ln yvT −ln yvt−1 = β0 +β1ln yvt−1 +βv ln yvt−1 −ln yvt−1 ( )+ ′ φ Xvt−1 +εvT 	 ﾠ (2)	 ﾠ
In Appendix 1 we show in detail how this equation can be aggregated from a household version (like (1)), 
and thus how the coefficients can be compared across household and village-level specifications. A few 
key points are worth highlighting. First, given our chosen functional form, it is easy to aggregate from the 
household-level regression by simple averaging, which is equivalent to using either village means, or 
village  dummies,  as  instruments  for  the  appropriate  household  specification. The  estimated  effect  of 
inequality will be numerically identical, whether estimated at the household or village level. Second, our 
specification  allows  us  to  better  highlight  the  distinction  between  the  village  and  household-level 
analysis: I m p o r t a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  in  key  parameter  estimates  emerge  in  the  details  of  empirical 
implementation, especially the loss of household-level controls, and the use of an internally consistent 
sample that properly aggregates (i.e., only the non-attritted, balanced panel). Third, following the insights 
of Devereux (2007), we show that our jackknifed specification (1) can be derived as the reduced form 
growth  equation  for  Deaton’s  (1985)  measurement-error-correcting  estimator  of  the  village-level 
specification (2). This provides “bonus” justification for using Equation (1) as our base specification. We 
are thus able to also implement the Deaton (1985) estimator for the village-level Equation (2).  
 
4.0  Empirical Results 
4.1  Data 
The d a t a  c o m e  f r o m  a n n u a l  h o u s e h o l d  s u r v e y s  c o n d u c t e d  b y  t h e  S u r v e y  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  t h e  
Research  Center  on  the  Rural  Economy  (RCRE).  The  survey  collected  detailed  household-level 
information on income and other household characteristics. The starting point is a sample from 1987 of 
4,847 households drawn from 82 continuously observed villages in nine provinces.
16 Originally planned 
as  an  annual  longitudinal  survey,  by  the  end  of  our  sample  (2002)  there  was  significant  attrition  of 
households,  on  the  order  of  30  percent.
17 W e  a r e  a b l e  t o  f o l l o w  a  “ p u r e ”  balanced  panel  of  3,424 
households every year between 1987 and 2002, excluding 1992 and 1994 when there was no survey. 
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16 The complete RCRE survey covers over 22,000 households in 300 villages in 31 provinces and administrative 
regions.  RCRE’s complete national survey is 31 percent of the annual size of the NBS Rural Household Survey.  By 
agreement, we have obtained access to data from 9 provinces (Anhui, Gansu, Guangdong, Henan, Hunan, Jiangsu, 
Jilin, Shanxi and Sichuan), or roughly one third of the RCRE survey.  
17 The RCRE survey continued past 2002; however, there were significant changes in survey design from 2003 that 
introduced serious comparability problems for income.  The post-2002 data cannot be pooled with previous surveys.  
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A  variety  of  definitions  are  useful.
18 F i r s t ,  h o u s e h o l d  m e m b e r s h i p  and  the  corresponding 
sampling frame are defined on the basis of residency and registration. Second, income is calculated as the 
sum of net income (gross revenue less current expenditures) from agriculture, farming sidelines (e.g. 
animal husbandry and livestock), family-run businesses, plus wage income (earned inside and outside the 
village), and transfers. We calculate the value of farm output that is not sold, and thus largely consumed 
by the household, at market prices. We also use household income before taxes, and deflate all nominal 
values into 1986 prices using the NBS rural consumer price index for each province. 
The key outcome in our analysis is “growth” of household per capita income. To mitigate the 
effect  of  transitory  shocks,  or  measurement  error,  on  income,  we  construct  two-year  averages  of 
household income for each two-year time period. Our initial period is 1987-88, and all household-level 
variables, and the village statistics calculated from them, are calculated using the average of 1987 and 
1988 outcomes for each household. Subsequent two-year endpoints, “T”, include: 1990-91, three years 
after the initial period (1987-88); 1995-96, the next period for which we have adjacent time periods (8 
years out); 1997-98; 1999-2000; and finally 2001-02, fourteen years after the initial period. 
In Table 1, we report the mean and quantiles of key variables for the panel households. Several 
things are noteworthy.  First, over the entire period per capita income growth averaged 3.0 percent per 
annum, but there were significant differences in the rates of growth from 1987-88 and our five ending 
dates.  This largely reflects cyclical factors:  Marked declines in economic activity accompanied the post-
Tiananmen economic retrenchment and the Asian Financial Crisis. Incomes actually fell between 1987-
1988 and 1990-1991, but recovered significantly by 1995-96 so that over the period between 1987-88 and 
1995-96, growth averaged 3.6 percent. Growth in the period ending in 1999-2000 was also lower than 
that ending in 1997-1998.  Second, there was clear heterogeneity in the success of households, but the 
dispersion in growth rates narrowed steadily over time.  At the top end, for example, the 90th percentile 
of growth rates fell from 11.6% for the period ending in 1995-1996 to “only” 8.5 percent by 2001-2002, 
while  fewer  households  experienced  negative  growth  rates.  Finally,  data  in  Table  1  also  reveal  a 
pronounced shift in the structure of incomes.  In 1987-88, agriculture accounted for half of household 
income (55%), but by 2001-2002, this had fallen by more than a third to 36%. Offsetting this decline was 
the growing importance of wage income earned locally and from outside the village, which grew from 
only 22% of income to 34%, and a slight increase in the role of income from family businesses.  
In  our  estimation  of  Equation  (1) w e  w i s h  t o  c o n t r o l  f o r  a s  m a n y  h o u s e h o l d  c o v a r i a t e s  a s  
possible, and these are described in Table 1. Of particular interest is household education, in this case the 
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18 The RCRE fixed point survey team has followed the definitions and protocols established as standards by the 
NBS Rural Household Survey unit since its inception in 1986. Further details and comparisons of the RCRE data 
source with other data from rural China are found in the main text and extensive appendices of Benjamin, Brandt, 
and Giles (2005)  
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years of education for working-age household members. The average in 1987-88 was only 5.56 years of 
schooling, varying from 2.88 to 9.00 years at the 10
th and 90
th percentiles. There was also variation across 
households  in  factor  endowments  of  labor  and  land,  as  summarized  by  the  dependency  ratio  and 
cultivated land. Finally, note that most households were aged between 31 and 50 years of age in 1987-88. 
This does not represent the complete age distribution in 1987, but reflects the higher attrition of older 
households by 2002. Those too young to head households in 1987 do not appear in our panel either. 
In the bottom part of Table 1 we report the key village characteristics that we include in our 
estimation. Our preferred estimates of these variables are based on all available households in the 1987-88 
sample, i.e., not just the balanced panel of households.
19 Our objective is to consistently capture local 
conditions at that time, and statistics based only on the panel households will be less reliable and sample 
sizes smaller.
20 Our key regressor is village inequality, and we report three measures in Table 1. First, the 
Gini coefficient for an average village was 0.20 in 1987-88. The mean, however, hides the variation of 
inequality across villages; inequality is as low as 0.14 at the 10
th percentile, and more than double at 0.28 
in the 90
th percentile. The Mean Log Deviation shows the same pattern, though it is lower in magnitude. 
The 90-10 ratio, which we use as a more robust indicator of inequality, is 2.56 on average. In the low 
inequality villages, the “rich” (90
th percentile) earn less than double of the “poor” (10
th percentile), while 
in the high inequality villages, the rich earn more than triple the incomes of the poor. Additional village 
controls include village averages of household education, the share of village income derived from the 
main sources (agriculture, wages, and family businesses), and two measures of l o c a l  p u b l i c  f i n a n c e :  
Village  tax  revenue  and  public  expenditures  per  capita.  Our  final  controls  are  for  topography  and 
geography, including a full set of province dummies. 
	 ﾠ
4.2  Regression Results: Main Household Findings 
  In Figure 1 we show a village-level scatter plot of the relationship between initial inequality and 
growth for each potential endpoint. With the exception of the lower average growth rates for the period 
ending in 1990-91, the other four periods show similar average annual growth rates to each other. While 
there is some variation in the slope of the fitted regression, there is also a consistently negative estimated 
relationship between inequality and growth, with the strongest relationship in 1997-98. Furthermore, the 
relationship does not appear to be driven by outliers: no single village or cluster of villages exerts undue 
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19 In some specifications, however, when we wish to illustrate issues of aggregation, we will use village-means and 
variables that are based entirely on an “internally consistent” set of balanced panel households only. 
20 Sample sizes in the full sample range from 15 to 137 households per village, with an average sample size of 60 
households per village, with most villages having between 30 and 90 households. In terms of underlying population, 
villages range in size from approximately 700 people (10
th percentile) to 3,000 people (90
th percentile), with an 
average population of 1,500.  
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influence on the slope of the regression line. The raw correlations therefore suggest that inequality is 
negatively related to growth. 
  In Table 2 we present the estimates of our core household-level regression (Equation 1) for each 
possible endpoint. We divide the analysis into two parts. In columns (1) through (6) we explore a few 
important issues of specification, culminating in our “bottom-line” results in column (5). In the second 
part, columns (7) through (11), we formally demonstrate the link between our household-level results, and 
the conventional village-level results. Column 1 shows the impact of inequality on growth when we use 
the  Gini  coefficient  as  a  measure  of  inequality.  The  estimated  effect  of  inequality  is  significant  and 
negative for all endpoints, declining from -0.257 in 1990-91, to -0.105 in 2001-02. The decline of the 
impact of inequality is consistent across all specifications, and a key result of the paper. In column (2) we 
move to the Mean Log Deviation as our inequality index. The pattern of coefficients (relative magnitude 
and statistical significance) is identical to that for the Gini. To benchmark the magnitude of the effect, a 
coefficient of 0.20 means that moving from a “high” to “low” inequality village (e.g., a drop in the mean 
log deviation of 0.10) is associated with a 0.02 increase in average annual growth rates. This compares to 
average annual growth rates of 0.035. In column (3) we employ the weights for attrition in order to 
evaluate the impact of this correction.
21 The results change modestly: the estimated effect of inequality is 
generally a bit smaller, to the extent that by 2001-2002, the estimated effect is no longer significant at the 
5%  level.
22 G i v e n  t h a t  t h e  c o r r e c t i o n  f o r  a t t r i t i o n  d o e s  m a t t e r  – e v e n  i f  o n l y  a  b i t  – w e  r e t a i n  t h i s  
throughout the remaining specifications. 
In the next column (4), we address the possibility of measurement error by using the more robust 
90-10 ratio as an instrument for the Mean Log Deviation. The first stage results are highly significant: the 
t-value  on  the  90-10  ratio  is  19.51,  so  there  is  no  “weak  instrument”  problem.  The  strength  of  the 
instrument is also illustrated in Figure 2, where we plot the Gini and the Mean Log Deviation against the 
90-10 ratio. This figure also illustrates a more important point: all three inequality measures are highly 
correlated with each other. The second-stage results in column (4) show notably higher estimated effects 
of inequality on growth, with a similar temporal pattern as before: steadily declining influence of initial 
inequality,  though  statistically  significant  through  2001-02.  These  results  suggest  that  the  Mean  Log 
Deviation  and the Gini may be noisy measures of income dispersion in the village, and that the more 
robust 90-10 ratio should be preferred (on its own, not merely as an instrument). There is otherwise no 
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21 Appendix Table 1 shows the marginal effects from the Probit Model used to calculate inverse probability weights 
based on observable characteristics as suggested in Wooldridge (2002). Note in particular that the probability of 
attrition is not correlated with the initial level of village inequality, which would otherwise be of potential concern. 
22 W e  f o r m a l l y  t e s t  w h e t h e r  t h e  i n e q u a l i t y  c o e f f i c i e n t s  a r e  s ignificant  across  years.  Consider  the  results  from 
Specification (3). We reject the equality of the 5 coefficients, with a p-value of 0.02. Comparing the 1995-96 and 
2001-02 coefficients alone, we marginally reject their equality with a p-value of 0.048.  
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reason to prefer one inequality measure over another, and so for our main results, we show both the Mean 
Log Deviation and the 90-10 ratio. 
Column (5) reports the results comparable to those in column (3), but using the jackknifed Mean 
Log Deviation as the inequality index.
 23 Comparing the coefficients in (5) to those in (3), we see that the 
estimated effect of inequality is slightly smaller. The inclusion of household “i” in the village inequality, 
at least in this instance, does not seem to lead to significant bias in the coefficient.  We still retain this 
procedure, however, as ex ante there are good reasons to employ the jackknifed statistics. Our estimated 
effect of inequality is statistically significant in all time periods except the most recent, and as in previous 
columns, the effect declines monotonically over time. In column (6) we show estimates comparable to 
(5), but with the jackknifed 90-10 ratio as our inequality measure. The results are similar to those using 
the Mean Log Deviation, though with sharper statistical significance, even including the most recent time 
period, 2001-2002.  
Controlling for a rich array of household and village regressors, the effect of inequality is difficult 
to dismiss: It is robust to controls for sample attrition, small sample bias, and accounting for measurement 
error. While it fades over time, local inequality appears to exert a purely external effect on household 
growth over and above any household-level proxies for growth potential. 
In the remaining columns we show how the household-level results can be directly compared to 
the village-level, following the discussion in Section 3.3 and Appendix 1. The last column, (11), shows 
the village-level results, the final destination of the aggregation exercise: The effects are generally weaker 
than at the household-level, with significant coefficients only for the 1995-96 and 1997-98 endpoints. 
There are a few key steps, however, from the household-level specification in column (2) to the village-
level in column (11). As it turns out, using village-level instead of household-level measures of growth 
and inequality has nothing to do with the change in results. The first big step is from column (2) to 
column (7), which is estimated at the household-level, but where we drop many of the covariates, notably 
the household-level controls. Compared to column (2), the estimated coefficients are smaller and less 
significant.
24  Next, in column (8), to ensure that the same household observations are included in the 
household and village-level specifications, we re-estimate the household-level regression using village 
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23 In Appendix Table 2 we report the coefficients on the other covariates for the specification in column (5). At the 
household-level,  we  find  the  most  important  predictors  of  household  income  growth  to  be  age,  with  younger 
households doing better, and to some extent, education (though only through 1995-96). For 1997-98 and 1999-2000, 
we find that village mean log income is positively related to growth consistent with Ravallion (1998), but otherwise 
its effect also fades over time. Very few other village-level variables matter in terms of statistical significance. In 
that sense, village-level inequality is remarkable as being the most significant village characteristic that matters 
throughout this time period. 
24 Indeed, the differential inclusion of the household-level covariates may also be part of the reason that Ravallion 
(1998) finds more significant results at the household than county-level: Controlling for household characteristics 
affects the precision of estimation, and also addresses possible omitted variables (non-linearities of the effect of 
own-income, etc.).  
Inequality and Growth in Rural China, Page 16 
statistics calculated only over the balanced panel of households. The estimated effects are even smaller, 
though statistically significant for the 1995-96 and 1997-98 endpoints. It is the combination of these two 
changes  in  specification–excluding t h e  h o u s e h o l d -level  covariates  and  using  only  the  balanced  panel 
sample to calculate initial village conditions–that drives the drop in the estimated effect of inequality from 
the household to the village-level regressions: It has nothing to do with aggregation from one level to the 
other per se.  
This is seen most clearly in column (9), where we estimate the household-level Equation (A1.4) 
by instrumental variables, using as instruments the village mean values of Mean Log Income, the Mean 
Log Deviation, and Mean Education.
25 This exercise yields the same results as column (8). We thus 
obtain the same coefficient estimates three ways: Estimation at the household level with either the village-
level regressors (column 8) or village-means as instruments (column 9); and the village-level results in 
column (11).
26 Finally, in column (10) we implement the Deaton (and Devereux) corrections for small 
sample bias. This entails only a small variation on the specification in column (9): We use the jackknifed 
village means instead of the straight village means as instruments for the household variables in Equation 
A1.4. For this specification, the estimated effects of inequality are slightly smaller, and significant only 
for the “peak” year of 1995-96. Because it accounts for the small-sample measurement error bias, this is 
the preferred “bottom-line” village-level result: inequality has a negative but generally insignificant effect 
that fades quickly after 1995-96. However, our overall preferred specification is column (5), which uses 
the same jackknifed inequality measure, but with the inclusion of the full suite of household covariates, 
and  with  village  statistics  calculated u s i n g  a l l  a v a i l a b l e  o b s e r v a t i o n s  f r o m  1 9 8 7-88. A s  e x p l a i n e d  i n  
Appendix 1, column (5) is a richer “reduced form” for the Deaton and Devereux specification presented 
in column (9). 
	 ﾠ
4.3  Regression Results: Heterogeneous Responses 
  Who is hurt most by high inequality? In Table 3 we present estimates of two variants of Equation 
(1), adding interaction effects between inequality and key dimensions of household covariates: education 
and cohort in one variant, and own-income in the other. For each time period, in column (1), we estimate 
interaction  effects  for  education  and  cohort.  For  the  cohort  interaction,  while  we  maintain  the  more 
flexible base effects for household age, we define the interaction in terms of “young” and “old”, with age 
40 as the cut-off. In column (2) we report interactions between inequality and a household’s position in 
the income distribution. We assign households to their quartile within their village, where the quartiles 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
25 Identically, we can use Village Dummies as instruments, creating a “Visual Instrumental Variables” estimate 
(intimated by Figure 1). 
26 As usual, the standard errors are slightly higher at the village level, as the Cluster Correction is not a perfect 
substitute for estimating at the village-level.  
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(like the inequality index) are calculated by a jackknife estimator (i.e., quartiles are calculated excluding 
household i). The base regression specification for the exploration of interactions is column (5) from 
Table 2. 
  Turning  first  to  the  education  and  cohort  interactions,  they  are  jointly  and  individually 
insignificant  for  1995-96,  and  2001-02,  when  the  overall  effect  of  inequality  is  also  insignificant. 
However,  in  the  middle t w o  t i me  p e r i o d s  o f  o u r  1 9 9 0 s  sample  (1997-98  and  1999-00),  we  see  that 
education significantly offsets the adverse effect of inequality: the impact of inequality hurts less educated 
households most. The timing coincides with the Asian financial crisis, and suggests that inequality hurt 
the least educated most during those periods, possibly due to reduced migration opportunities. The cohort 
interaction is also significant for 1999-00, and borderline in 1997-98. This interaction coefficient suggests 
that the effect of inequality was worse for the young, which seems somewhat surprising. However, it is 
the young that normally have the highest income growth potential and are the most mobile, and the 
adverse impact of inequality seems to have hurt these households most. In other words, income growth is 
potentially higher for younger households, but those in more unequal villages experience stunted growth. 
  In column (2) for each time period, we report the interaction effects for income. The most striking 
finding is that the interaction effects for income quartile are individually and jointly insignificant for all 
time periods. The adverse effects of inequality hurt rich and poor equally. In terms of implications about 
the  mechanism,  we  view  this  as  speaking  most  clearly  to  credit  market  explanations:  the  effect  of 
inequality exists even when controlling for a rich set of household characteristics, and furthermore, affects 
rich  as  much  as  poor  households  within  a  village.  This  is  not  what  we  would  expect  to  observe  if 
imperfect credit markets drove the relationship. Instead, the effect of inequality spills over households 
across the income distribution, though with less impact on households with higher education. The only 
nuance of the income interactions worth noting is that in 2001-02, where we estimated an insignificant 
impact overall, we do estimate significant negative effects of inequality on the bottom two quartiles. 
While not significantly different than the effect on their richer neighbors, to the extent that there is an 
impact of inequality in the most recent time period, it does seem to fall on the poorest households. The 
effect of inequality does not completely go away for those quartiles. 
 
4.4  Regression Results: Composition of Income 
  We may be able to learn more about the nature of the effect of inequality by investigating links 
between inequality and other measures of economic development. One potentially informative dimension 
is the composition of household income, which will reflect changes in the economic structure of villages, 
and  households’  ability  to  participate  in  more  lucrative  economic  opportunities,  especially  in  non-
agricultural  employment.  To  conduct  this  exercise,  we  make  a  slight  modification  to  the  base  
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specification  (Equation  (2)),  replacing  the  dependent  variable  by  the  share  of  income  earned  by  a 
household in a given activity, A:  SAi,vT . The activities are “Agriculture”, “Wage Income,” and “Family 
Businesses.”
27 The omitted category is “Other” income. We also add as controls the household’s share of 
income from each activity in the initial time period. In this way, we are estimating the effect of inequality 
on the change in share of income in each activity, controlling for initial household participation in the 
portfolio of activities. Did high inequality distort household evolution or movement into various income 
generating activities? The regression specification is therefore: 
 
SAi,vT =δ0 + ′ β Xvt−1 + ′ γ Xi,vt−1 + φASAi,vt−1
A=1
3
∑ +δ1lnyi,vt−1 +δ2lny 
vt−1(i) +δvIQ 
vt−1(i) +uAi,vT   (3) 
Again, our base specification is the same as column (5) of Table 2. Core results are shown in columns (1) 
to (3) in Table 4, for the two most recent time periods, 1999-00 and 2001-02 to keep the dimension of 
discussion m a n a g e a b l e .  We  also  introduce  interactions  between  initial  inequality  and  education  and 
cohort following the discussion of Table 3, presented in columns (4) through (6). 
  For neither period do we find any effect of inequality on the composition of income. The signs 
are consistent with inequality reducing participation in wage-earning activities, and increasing the share 
of income in agriculture, but the estimates are imprecise. The interaction results are more interesting. For 
both periods we see that inequality significantly affects the ability of lower education households to move 
into wage-earning activities inside or outside the village, tilting them instead towards the less lucrative 
agricultural  sector.  This  does  not  “explain”  the  growth  results,  but  it  does  help  with  some  of  the 
accounting:  the  adverse  impact  of  inequality  appears  to  operate  by  limiting  access  of  households  to 
higher-income off-farm employment opportunities. Stated differently, in more equal villages, everyone is 
able to participate in off-farm employment if they otherwise are able to do so. In the unequal villages, 
those households with low education are “trapped” in farming, and experienced lower income growth, 
especially through the 1990s when crop prices were low.
28 By 2001-02, as crop prices started to recover, 
such households were still disproportionately involved in agriculture, but their overall incomes were less 
adversely affected by their having lived in high inequality villages in 1987-88. 
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27 U s i n g  a  s h a r e -based  specification  allows  us  to  estimate  this  equation  at  the  household-level,  even  when 
households have “zero” income from a particular source. The overall response will capture the combined movement 
from zero to positive (i.e., participation), as well as the level of income from a given activity. 
28 This is also consistent with the prediction of Chong and Gradstein (2007b) that households in high inequality 
settings may operate disproportionately in the “informal sector” to avoid predation by the higher income households 
through  local  institutions.  We  doubt  that  this  specific  mechanism  operated  in  Chinese  villages,  and  that  the 
education interactions instead point to better educational opportunities, or higher returns to education, in lower 
inequality villages.  
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4.5  The Potential Role of Village Heterogeneity 
  We find robust evidence that initial village inequality has a long-lasting, but fading, effect on 
household growth rates, but as we noted in Section 3.2, this is insufficient evidence to establish a causal 
link  between  inequality  and  growth.  While  we  can  rule  out  a  large  set  of  mechanical  and  other 
endogeneity explanations, our most serious reservation is that inequality reflects other initial conditions 
that are correlated with both inequality and growth, which we denoted θvt−1. The conventional approach 
for dealing with that sort of unobserved heterogeneity is to control for village fixed effects through a first-
differenced implementation of the growth equation.
29 If we can track repeated episodes of growth, i.e., 
first-difference growth rates, then this exercise is potentially informative. As is well known, however, 
there are significant limitations to examining growth rates over short periods in first-differenced models 
because the covariation of high-frequency measures of growth and inequality after controlling for village-
level unobservables may not be sufficient to identify the relationship between inequality and growth. 
Inequality is a slowly-evolving variable, and even with national-level samples, period-to-period changes 
may  be  driven  largely  by  measurement  error.  In  the  context  of  rural  China  over  this  time  period, 
measurement error is an obvious concern. Moreover, we are also concerned about simultaneity bias, as 
growth itself may change the income distribution (a “Kuznets Process”).
30 Moreover, some of the core 
implicit assumptions about the error term necessary for the panel-based approach to work may be violated 
in our data. Nevertheless, the exercise is worth conducting, as it helps to reveal important aspects of the 
inequality-growth relationship. 
  Consider the base village-level equation: 
gvt =α0 + ′ β Xvt−1 +α1 ′lnyvt−1 +αvIQvt−1 +θv +εvT   (4) 
where growth is defined as that between period t-1 and t,  lnyvt −lnyvt−1. Note that in keeping with the 
focus on household growth, we examine the average household growth rate, not the growth in average 
incomes. Our empirical objective is to determine whether our estimate of αv  is robust to controlling for 
village  “fixed  effects.” I m p l e m e n t a t i o n  r e q u i r e s  a d d r e ssing  two  immediate  concerns:  constructing  a 
village-panel data set, and using an estimator that accounts for the potentially dynamic error structure 
implicit  in  Equation  (4).  To  construct  the  village-panel  we  use  the  balanced  panel  of h o u s e h o l d s  t o  
construct the growth-rate and mean log income variables for each period, symmetric with the household 
regressions,  and  the  larger  non-attritted  samples  to  construct  the  key  village  covariates  like  village 
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29 S e e ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  F o r b e s  ( 2 0 0 0 )  a n d  B a n e r j e e  a n d  D u f l o  ( 2 0 0 3 )  f o r  a  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  m e r i t s  a n d  p i t f a l l s  
associated with the panel-data (“fixed effects”) approach in cross-country data. 
30 Se e  Kuz ne t s  ( 1955) .  Ra va l l i on a nd Che n ( 2007)  e xpl or e  pr e c i s e l y t hi s  que s t i on a s  t he y i nve s t i ga t e  l i nka ge s  
between growth rates and various measures of poverty and inequality using nationally representative NBS data. 
Panel analyses using state-level data from the US also finds evidence of a Kuznets process leading to a positive 
association between inequality and growth (Frank, 2009).  
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inequality. We have seven available two-year periods: 1987-88, 1989-90, 1991-93, 1995-96, 1997-98, 
1999-00, and 2001-02.
31 In all specifications we include the core set of village covariates (controls for 
initial mean log income, education, land, dependency ratio, composition of village income, geography, 
and province dummies), but we also add period dummies. We address the dynamic panel data issues 
through the use of a variety of estimators, and discuss details in Appendix 2. 
  The key results are presented in Table 5. We vary the estimation in two main dimensions: First, 
by estimator, and second by the length of the difference. Longer differences may be more robust to high-
frequency  variation  of  inequality  driven  by  noise,  and  may  better  capture  the  “long  run”  effects  of 
inequality on growth.
32 We also show results for both measures of inequality used in the cross-section 
analysis: the Mean Log Deviation, and the 90-10 ratio. In the first column we report the pooled OLS 
estimates of Equation (4), with no account for fixed effects but with standard errors clustered at the 
village-level. The estimated effect of inequality is negative, but very small, and statistically insignificant. 
Growth  from  one  period  to  the  next  is  unrelated  to  previous i n e q u a l i t y  w h e n  w e  p o o l  g r o w t h  a n d  
inequality from the entire period. In the second column, we take first-differences to sweep out the fixed 
effects. Whether we take short (one period) or long (up to four period) differences, we find no significant 
effect of growth on inequality. If anything, the effect is positive, though insignificant, as one might expect 
if  growth  caused  inequality.  Accounting  for  dynamic  panel  data  issues  does  nothing  to  change  the 
conclusion: when we difference to eliminate the village fixed effects, there is no relationship between 
inequality and growth. 
  On the  surface,  this  suggests  that  unobserved  village-level  heterogeneity  may  be  driving  our 
previous results. However, the evidence is more complicated. As a starting point, note that the inequality-
growth relationship vanishes before we control for village fixed-effects in the pooled OLS specifications 
of Table 5. Admitting evidence of the impact of inequality from periods after 1987-88 seems to diminish 
the estimated effect of inequality. Alternatively, it could be that short-run estimates of growth are less 
affected by inequality. That is unlikely to be true, however, as we saw in Table 2 that the effect of 
inequality is strongest early in the growth trajectory. To address this question we break apart the village-
panel into a series of pair-wise cross-sections, and estimate the village-level cross-section specification 
with varying beginning and endpoints. The results are quite striking and reported in Appendix Table 3. 
We find a significant negative relationship between growth and inequality in 1987-88 and every endpoint, 
except 2001-02 (as in Table 2), though even for 2001-02 the result is significant for the 90-10 ratio. 
However,  when  using  pairs  of  endpoints  with  the  starting  period  after  1987-88,  we  do  not  find  a 
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31  Note that there was no survey in 1992 or 1994, so the period 1991-93 is constructed slightly differently from all 
of the other periods with adjacent years (1991 and 1993 being non-adjacent). 
32 Note that with the longer differences, given that the IV-based procedures are based on lagged observations, it is 
not possible to properly implement the FD-IV or WG estimators given the short duration of our series.  
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relationship between inequality and subsequent growth. Specifically, by 1989-90, village inequality loses 
its predictive power for subsequent growth. This means that to the extent that village inequality matters, it 
was inequality, or factors correlated with inequality, at the outset of reforms that affected subsequent 
growth. While robust to a battery of specifications, the 1987-88 results do not hold for subsequent sets of 
initial conditions. Because we do not have data prior to 1987-88, we cannot evaluate whether there is 
something specific to this period alone, or whether it represents the end of the early or pre-reform period. 
What we can conclude, however, is that whatever predictive content is contained in 1987-88 village 
inequality, it is gone for subsequent periods. 
  To some extent, this should not be surprising: there is no reason to believe that the determinants 
of inequality in 1987-88 were the same as in subsequent periods. The sources of income variation across 
households evolved with economic and market development, as well as being driven by economic shocks. 
Indeed, we can see this in the evolution of village-level inequality over the time-period. In Figure 3 we 
illustrate this by plotting the evolution of village-level inequality as a function of initial inequality, with 
the 45-degree line (no change in inequality) as reference. A few points are worth noting. First, village 
inequality is generally, though not universally, rising, as most villages have inequality above the 45-
degree line. Second, there is general convergence of the levels of inequality across villages: increases of 
inequality  were  systematically  highest  for  those  villages  with  the  lowest  levels  of  inequality.  The 
“experiment” that generated differences of inequality across villages in 1987-88 is not likely the same as 
that which generated changes of inequality between 1987-88 and 2001-02. The panel data exercise is thus 
likely doomed from the outset: It is predicated on variation in the explanatory variables being comparable 
between and within villages. Combined with results from Table 2 that showed that the effect of inequality 
on growth was not constant in the first place, the village-panel probably cannot be used to address the 
question of whether the growth-inequality relationship is driven by fixed heterogeneity. However, the 
exercise is still revealing as to the limited nature by which increases in inequality potentially mattered 
over  this  time  period:  After  its  initial  impact  from  1987-88,  there  is  no  evidence  of  a  link  between 
subsequent inequality and growth. 
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5.0  Conclusions and Interpretation 
If in 1987 a compulsive gambler wagered that between two otherwise identical Chinese villages, 
the low inequality village would be richer in 1997 than the high inequality village, he would likely win. 
Our estimates suggest that if the difference in the Mean Log Deviation was 0.09, i.e., the difference 
between  the  10th  and  90th  percentiles  of  inequality  in  1987,  the  average  annual  growth  rate  for 
households in the low inequality village would be 1.8 percentage points higher relative to a median 
household  annual  growth  rate  of  3.4  percent.  By  this  standard,  high  inequality  was  a  robust  and  
Inequality and Growth in Rural China, Page 22 
economically significant predictor of slower growth. If he made the same bet for growth fifteen years out 
(to 2002), it would be a closer call, though a better than fair bet. Beyond that, however, if he was greedy 
enough to ride the inequality horse in other dimensions, placing money on rising inequality as a marker of 
lower growth, it would be no better than a crap shoot. The preponderance of evidence we find suggests 
that inequality did not have a reliable causal impact on growth. We do not believe that higher inequality 
impeded growth in rural China. 
This conclusion rests on several strands of evidence. First, by using household-level data we are 
able  to  rule  out  imperfect  credit  markets a s  t h e  s o u r c e  o f  t h e  c a u s a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  o b s e r v e d  
inequality and growth. Instead, the results using household-level data point to institutional features of 
villages at the outset of reforms as underlying the correlation between inequality and growth. Important 
though those institutions may have been, whatever they were, there is little to suggest that they were a 
causal consequence of inequality. This is most clearly seen when we exploit time-series variation of 
inequality within-villages (in the panel), and all links between growth and inequality disappear. Even if 
we keep the cross-section approach, but use village inequality from the 1990s as the basis of predicting 
growth, we find that inequality ceases to matter: inequality in the 1990s is different from inequality earlier 
in the reform period. Even focusing on 1987 inequality, the source of a safe bet for growth to 1997, we 
find that the effect of inequality fades by 2002. 
We still learn something about the inequality-related determinants of growth in rural China. For 
example, our evidence points to the likelihood of growth-impeding polices that were associated with 
higher inequality. The policies seemed to trap their victims, especially the lower-educated in agriculture 
(a relative dead end during much of this period), and impeded their movement into more lucrative labor 
markets. We cannot be sure exactly what these institutions might be, but likely candidates include those 
affecting household returns to running small businesses, the flexibility accorded to households in meeting 
local grain quotas (i.e, the degree to which these commitments could be made with cash instead of grain), 
and the costs of getting local government permission to migrate to take advantage of newly emerging job 
opportunities (deBrauw and Giles, 2008). Whatever the policies or institutions were, their effects eroded 
very quickly in the reform period. Our data do not allow us to determine whether high inequality caused 
such policies, or reflected a more general level of dysfunction at the local level as villages embarked on 
the reform process. 
More generally, and setting aside the profound problem of causality, our results show the value of 
using household-level data to address the question of whether inequality has a purely external impact on 
growth.  Indeed,  there  is  no  better  way  to  distill  the  external  effect  from  that  due  to  aggregation. 
Furthermore, the household-level data can be used to explore the heterogeneity of responses that may be 
informative about the underlying economic mechanisms. Such evidence is especially useful in ruling out  
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factor-market explanations, and pointing by implication to an institutional class of explanations.  Our 
excellent cross-village data, with all the benefits of clean and comparable measurement of inequality and 
growth over time, however, also show the limits of how much can be ultimately learned in a growth-
inequality  regression.  Unless  a  researcher  is  willing  to  believe  that  both  the  underlying  relationship 
between growth and inequality is stable, and all variation in inequality is driven by the same “treatment,” 
then little that is definitive can be learned from this exercise. While it is difficult to believe that either 
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I. Household-level Data (Panel households; N = 3,424)
Per Capita Income (Constant 1986 Yuan):
1987-88 526 229 448 896
1990-91 518 234 425 870
1995-96 709 316 593 1,192
1997-98 742 330 630 1,223
1999-00 749 310 614 1,312
2001-02 826 334 678 1,443
Annualized Growth Rates from 1987-88 to:
1990-91 -0.009 -0.178 -0.009 0.157
1995-96 0.036 -0.045 0.039 0.116
1997-98 0.034 -0.034 0.034 0.102
1999-00 0.027 -0.035 0.029 0.089
2001-02 0.030 -0.026 0.031 0.085
Composition of Income (Shares):
Agriculture, 1987-88 0.55 0.17 0.56 0.89
Wages, 1987-88 0.22 0.00 0.13 0.61
Business, 1987-88 0.14 0.00 0.04 0.45
Agriculture, 2001-2002 0.36 0.03 0.31 0.79
Wages, 2001-2002 0.34 0.00 0.31 0.79
Business, 2001-2002 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.59
Other Household Characetristics in 1987-88:
Household Education 5.56 2.88 6.00 9.00
Household Size 4.77 3.00 5.00 7.00
Dependency Ratio 0.43 0.20 0.50 0.60
Cultivated Land (Mu) 1.46 0.50 1.17 2.81
Head Age <= 30 0.09
Head Age between 31 and 40 0.33
Head Age between 41 and 50 0.35
Head Age between 51 and 60 0.16
Head Age 61 and over 0.06
II. Village-level Characteristics in 1987-88 (N = 82)
Inequality of  Per Capita Household Income:
Gini Coefficient 0.20 0.14 0.19 0.28
Mean Log Deviation 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.12
90-10 Ratio 2.56 1.91 2.46 3.39
Other Characteristics:
Household Education 5.53 4.00 5.66 7.13
Share of Income from Agriculture 0.54 0.25 0.59 0.74
Share of Income from Wages 0.20 0.07 0.16 0.37
Share of Income from Family Enterprises 0.15 0.05 0.13 0.30
Village Total Tax Revenue Per Capita 0.46 0.06 0.31 0.92
Village Total Public Expenditure Per Capita 0.46 0.06 0.30 0.90
Mountainous Terrain 0.26
Hilly Terrain 0.39





1) Household-level statistics are calculated over the 3,424 panel households, while the village-level 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Base Effects:
Inequality (MlnD) -0.726* -0.257 -0.344* -0.188 -0.268* -0.131 -0.142 -0.074
(0.309) (0.181) (0.092) (0.104) (0.078) (0.086) (0.082) (0.078)
HH Education 8788 0.000 0.004* -0.002* 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Age <= 30 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.003 0.004 0.009 -0.001 0.009
(0.013) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
31 <= Age <= 40 -0.021 -0.024* 0.000 -0.007* 0.005 -0.005* 0.000 -0.004*
(0.011) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
51 <= Age <= 60 0.002 -0.196 -0.009* -0.054 -0.007* -0.075 -0.010* -0.079
(0.007) (0.153) (0.002) (0.084) (0.002) (0.070) (0.002) (0.069)
Age > 60 -0.034* -0.035* -0.018* -0.018* -0.017* -0.017* -0.019* -0.019*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Income Quartile (Q1) 0.002 0.000 0.005 0.005
(0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Income Quartile (Q2) 0.001 0.003 0.009 0.009
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Income Quartile (Q3) 0.004 -0.001 0.002 0.004
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Interactions:
Inequality * Education 0.064 0.031* 0.024* 0.008
(0.038) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Inequality * Under 40 -0.046 -0.108 -0.134* -0.052
(0.159) (0.056) (0.039) (0.055)
Inequality * Q1 -0.067 -0.054 -0.075 -0.079
(0.099) (0.084) (0.070) (0.069)
Inequality * Q2 -0.015 -0.034 -0.103 -0.084
(0.099) (0.073) (0.069) (0.087)
Inequality * Q3 -0.032 0.028 -0.003 -0.006
(0.085) (0.069) (0.067) (0.067)
Combined Effect by Quartile:
Combined Q1 -0.281* -0.242* -0.206* -0.154*
(0.091) (0.094) (0.078) (0.074)
Combined Q2 -0.230* -0.221* -0.234* -0.158*
(0.102) (0.090) (0.077) (0.080)
Combined Q3 -0.246* -0.160 -0.134 -0.081
(0.088) (0.086) (0.075) (0.077)
F-Interactions 1.23 0.33 6.48* 0.77 8.21* 2.06 1.51 1.59
(0.2980) (0.8005) (0.0024) (0.5162) (0.0006) (0.1121) (0.2264) (0.1982)
Notes:
Exploring Interaction Effects: The Effect of Inequality on Growth by Education, Cohort, and Initial Income
1) Each specification is based on household-level specification with full household and village covariates and Jacknifed 
Inequality (Column (5) of Table 2)
2) For each endpoint, we estimate the household specification with separate sets of interactions for Education and Cohort, and 
Income Quartile. The Cohort Interaction is based on an indicator of whether the household head was 40 years or younger in 
1987-88.
3) "F-Interactions" is the F-statistic for the null hypothesis of whether the interaction effects are jointly zero.
4) "Combined Q1" (etc.) are the total effects of inequality on income growth for households in a specified 1987-88 Income 
Quartile
TABLE 3
(Cluster-corrected Standard Errors in Parentheses)



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1)  The fitted values are based on simple regressions of growth from period 1987-88 through period T, on 
initial inequality in 1987-88. The regressions are weighted by the number of households in the village 
sample. The number of villages is 82. 
2)  The regression coefficients (and t-values) are for 1990-91: -0.084 (0.46); for 1995-96: -0.157 (1.87); 
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1)  Each scatter plot is a graph of village inequality (for the Mean Log Deviation, or the Gini Coefficient) 
versus the village 90-10 ratio in 1987-88. The relationship represented in these plots underlies the 
“reduced form” or “first stage” for the correction of potential measurement error of inequality, using 
the 90-10 ratio as an instrument. 
2)  For the Mean Log Deviation, the t-value of the coefficient on the 90-10 ratio is 24.68 (F = 609.26), 
while similar t-value for the Gini cofficient regression on the 90-10 ratio is 20.38 (F = 415.43). As an 
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1)  This graph plots village-level inequality in subsequent time periods against initial inequality in 1987-
88. 
2)  We show the 45-degree line along which villages would be if inequality were unchanged over time. 
3)  We also show the fitted values of a regression of inequality in the final period (2001-02) as a function 
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Appendix 1: Relating the Household and Village-level Specifications 
 
As our estimation is conducted at the household-level, we avoid most issues of aggregation. However, it 
is still worth relating our approach (Equation (1)) to the more conventional village-level specification, 
especially since all of the key variation (of inequality) resides at the village-level. To begin with, consider 
a simplified village-level specification relating growth to inequality (the Mean Log Deviation): 
   
gvT = ln yvT −ln yvt−1 = β0 +β1ln yvt−1 +βv ln yvt−1 −ln yvt−1 ( )+εvt   (A1.1) 
Note that this is a departure from the previous literature as we define growth as the difference in the mean 
log incomes (i.e., average household growth rate), as opposed to the change in log mean incomes. This 
allows  cleaner  aggregation  from  the  household-level.  There  are  several  ways  to  obtain  (A1.1)  by 
averaging a household specification.  
Consider first a household-level model that allows for an external effect of mean village (log) 
income, as well as own income, plus village income inequality: 
   
gi,vT = ln yi,vT −ln yi,vt−1 =α0 +α1ln yi,vt−1 +α2ln yvt−1 +αv ln yvt−1 −ln yvt−1 ( )+εi,vT   (A1.2) 
This averages by village to: 
   
gvT =α0 +(α1 +α2)ln yvt−1 +αv ln yvt−1 −ln yvt−1 ( )+εvt   (A1.3) 
Notice that the coefficient on    ln yvt−1  captures the combined effect of own (log) household income, and 
mean (log) village income. The effects are not separately identified at the village-level. This is related to 
the  main  point  raised  in  Ravallion  (1998),  though  the  confounding  of  the  own-income  effect  with 
inequality is not an issue with our specification, as we use “mean logs” as opposed to “log means” as our 
key covariates. 
A second way to obtain a version of (1.1) is to specify the household-level equation as:  
     
gi,vT =α0 +α1ln yi,vt−1 +α2ln yvt−1 +αv ln yvt−1 −ln yi,vt−1 ( )
DEVi,vt−1
     
+εi,vT  
(A1.4) 
The  key  difference  between  (A1.4)  and  (A1.2)  is  that  the  inequality  measure  is 
   
DEVi,vt−1 ≡ ln yvt−1 −ln yi,vt−1, the amount by which household i’s income is less than the log of the mean 
income in the village (controlling for both the independent effect of own log income, and the mean log 
income in the village). This equation also aggregates to the same village-level regression (A1.1). At the 
village-level, we cannot tell whether it is MLD or DEV that affects average household income growth. 
From our perspective, the distinction is not important, as there is no “right” measure of inequality. Inequality and Growth in Rural China, Appendices: Page 2 
 
  Mechanically, the village-level equation (A1.1) can be estimated using the household-level data 
and specification (A1.4) by 2SLS using as instruments either a vector of village dummies, or identically a 
vector of village means,    ln yvt−1, MLDvt−1 ( see,  for  example, Angrist and Pischke (2009) and “Visual 
Instrumental Variables”). As long as the weights are correct (i.e., use the number of households in a 
village as weights in the village-level specification), then the household (2SLS) and village-level (WLS) 
specifications will yield identical coefficients for αv,βv. This exercise is conducted Column (9) of Table 
2, which is compared to Column (8) of Table 2. 
While it is conventional to estimate the village-level (or country-level) regression using village 
sample  averages  and  measures  of  inequality  (e.g.,     ln yvt−1, MLDvt−1),  there  are  small-sample  and 
measurement error issues with using sample averages as “proxies” for population moments (Deaton, 
1985). Devereux (2007) shows, however, that the Deaton measurement-error estimator is identical to a 
Jack-Knife Instrumental Variable (JIVE) estimator, where Jack-knifed sample means serve as instruments 
for  individual-level  variables.  The  intent  in  that  exercise,  it  should  be  noted,  is  NOT t o  e s t i ma t e  o r  
identify  the  individual-level  specification,  but  to  correct  for  measurement  error  in  the  village-level 
(aggregate)  specification.  Adapting  Devereux’s  framework,  the  implied  “structural”  equation  at  the 
household-level is: 
     
gi,vT =α0 +(α1 +α2)ln yi,vt−1 +α3 ln yvt−1 −ln yi,vt−1 ( )
DEVi,vt−1
     
+εi,vT  
(A1.5) 
Correcting for measurement error (implementing Deaton’s estimator using Devereux’s Jack-knife result) 
simply involves using 
     
ln y 
vt−1(i) and      MLD 
vt−1(i)  as instruments for 
   
ln yi,vt−1 and 
   
DEVi,vt−1. The implied 
reduced form equation for 
   
gi,vT  in this approach is: 
     
gi,vT = π0 +π1ln y 
vt−1(i) +π2 MLD 
vt−1(i) +vi,vT   (A1.6) 
Except for our inclusion of covariates (which can be easily incorporated into Devereux’s framework), this 
reduced  form  (A1.6)  is  identical  to  our  structural  equation  (1).  In  other  words,  our  main  estimating 
equation  can  be  seen  as  “highly  similar”  to  the  implied  reduced-form  associated  with  Deaton’s 
measurement error correcting group-means estimator.
1 It is not necessary that our model be imbedded 
                                                 
1  There is one other bit of slippage: in this discussion we treat    ln yvt−1as a known parameter. Of course, it is not. 
However, because the sample mean is inside the non-linear logarithm function, the linear algebra associated with the 
JIVE estimator does not hold exactly (without treating it as a constant). In our empirical work, however, we use the 
Jack-knifed version of 
     
 yvt−1(i) inside the logarithm to address “in spirit” the same small-sample (measurement error) 
problem.  Note  that  this  only  effects  the  degree  to  which  our  equation  (1)  is  an  exact r e d u c e d  f o r m  f o r  t h e  
Deaton/Devereux specification. Inequality and Growth in Rural China, Appendices: Page 3 
 
within this framework, as Equation (1) is a bona fide structural model in its own right. However, equation 
(A1.6) allows us to better illustrate the advantages of using the household-level data to correct for a 
variety of potential econometric problems associated with using the aggregated data, and to precisely 
highlight the role of aggregation. 
 
Appendix 2: Expanded Discussion of Panel Data Models 
 
The discussion in this appendix provides further detail on the panel data analysis presented in 
Table 5 and discussed in Section 4.5. As noted in the body of Section 4.5, the analysis summarized in 
Table 5 first examines the relationship described in Equation (4) between growth and lagged inequality 
over short time periods, and then implements first-differenced models that eliminate the effects of fixed 
village unobservables. It then examines whether controlling for biases potentially introduced if growth 
and lagged income are both systematically related to a dynamic unobservable in the error term. 
The base OLS specification is presented in column (1) and suggests that when short-term growth 
rates are regressed on lagged inequality, the results are statistically insignificant whether we use the Mean 
Log Deviation or the 90-10 ratio as our inequality measure. Column (2) shows straight first-differenced 
(FD) models that sweep out unobserved fixed effects, employing differences of increasing duration from 
short  (one-period)  to  long  (four-period)  differences.  In  these f i r s t -differenced  models,  there  is  no 
significant effect of growth on inequality, and if anything, there is a positive (though insignificant) effect 
as one expects with a Kuznets process. 
Dynamic issues arise with the concern that change in growth and lag growth (or lag change in 
levels) will be may be systematically related through a common error component. Remember that change 
in growth (the dependent variable) is calculated as  lnyit −lnyit−1 ( )− lnyit−1 −lnyit−2 ( ), and the change in 
lagged levels (a regressor)  is  lnyit−1 −lnyit−2 ( ). Common error in periods  t −1 or  t −2 may lead to a 
mechanical negative correlation between the change in growth and the change in the lagged levels. More 
importantly, the lag change in the inequality measure (Mean Log Difference) has components of the same 
error term as the mean log level of income. We thus estimate instrumented versions of the FD models 
(FD-IV) models, in which we employ as instruments period  t − 3 values of the levels of lagged income 
and lagged inequality. At least mechanically in this model, period   t − 3 measures of these variables are 
not part of either the dependent variable, or the lagged changes of our main regressors. As long as the 
t − 3 levels of these variables significantly predict the regressors (which are changes), and are in turn 
uncorrelated with the error term, then these lagged values will be eligible instruments. We implement this 
procedure in the third column of each panel, for the first-difference specifications only. Note that while Inequality and Growth in Rural China, Appendices: Page 4 
 
imprecisely estimated (and statistically insignificant), the magnitude of the coefficient on the difference in 
lagged inequality has increased by an order of magnitude for the model using mean log deviation, and the 
coefficient on the 90-10 ratio remains positive and insignificant. Results from this exercise should be 
treated with some caution, however, as the instruments, while conventional are relatively weak: The 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic is between 2.15 and 2.42 for the mean log deviation and 90-10 models, 
respectively. 
Next, we implement the “WG Estimator,” as an alternative procedure for estimating our dynamic 
panel-data specification. The WG Estimator essentially provides a fixed effects approach to estimating the 
dynamic panel model. The key assumption behind this model is that the main source of bias is introduced 
through the lag growth of income term. In this model, the focus is on addressing the lagged dependent 
variable only, and we treat the lagged inequality measure as exogenous. This reduces the demands on 
finding  instruments  (which  are  lagged  regressors,  as  before).  Again,  we  observe  a  positive  and 
insignificant relationship between one-period lag inequality and subsequent growth for both measures of 
inequality. 
Finally, we compare the performance of the WG estimator to an FD-IV  model  also  treating 
inequality as exogenous (as opposed to endogenous, as in the FD-IV specification). We denote this “WG-
Comp” and show the results in the fifth column for each measure of inequality. The WG-Comp estimator 
yields a similar estimate to the straight WG estimator: there is no relationship between lagged inequality 
and growth, once we account for error structures that include a “fixed effect.” 
 (1) (2)
Initial Village Inequality (Mean Log Deviation) -0.516 -0.920
(1.698) (1.726)
Household Variables (in initial period, 1987-88):
Log Initial Income 18.614 -0.195
(5.633) (0.063)
Log Initial Income - Squared -2.873
(0.908)
Log Initial Income - Cubed 0.144
(0.049)
Share of Income from Agriculture in 1987-88 0.180 0.197
(0.217) (0.217)
Share of Income from Wages in 1987-88 0.082 0.093
(0.192) (0.196)
Share of Income from Family Businesses in 1987-88 0.010 -0.012
(0.185) (0.184)
Household Education in 1987-88 -0.004 -0.003
(0.010) (0.010)
Log Household Size 0.087 0.097
(0.074) (0.073)
Dependency Ratio 0.183 0.190
(0.143) (0.142)
Log Cultivated Land 0.009 0.010
(0.023) (0.024)
Head Age <= 30 -0.089 -0.094
(0.078) (0.078)
Head Age between 31 and 40 0.030 0.029
(0.052) (0.052)
Head Age between 51 and 60 -0.184 -0.180
(0.065) (0.064)
Head Age 61 and over -0.275 -0.257
(0.098) (0.097)
Village Variables (in initial period, 1987-88):
Mean Log Per Capita Income -0.095 -0.074
(0.256) (0.259)
Average Education 0.049 0.054
(0.065) (0.065)
Cultivated Land Per Capita -0.115 -0.093
(0.153) (0.155)
Village Dependency Ratio 0.193 0.369
(1.598) (1.583)
Village Share of Income from Agriculture -0.652 -0.563
(1.492) (1.458)
Village Share of Income from Wages -0.650 -0.504
(1.522) (1.500)
Village Share of Income from Family Businesses -0.677 -0.462
(1.700) (1.642)
Village Tax Revenue Per Capita 0.954 0.847
(0.427) (0.432)
Village Government Expenditure Per Capita -0.846 -0.769
(0.405) (0.411)
Sample Size (1987-88) 4847 4847
Notes:
2) All specifications include village location and province dummies
3) Statistically significant coefficients highlighted (at the 5% level)
4) Specification (1), with the cubic in household income, is used to generate inverse probability weights for 
the attrition corrections throughout the paper.
Attrition Equations
Probit Estimates: Probability of Being in the Panel Estimating Sample
(Marginal Effects, Standard Errors in Parentheses)
In Panel Sample
APPENDIX TABLE 1
1) Dependent variable is the probability of being in the primary estimating sample (observed in all years from 
1987 through 2002, with complete variable set)Endpoint: 1990-91 1995-96 1997-98 1999-00 2001-02
Initial Inequality (MlnD, Jacknifed) -0.354* -0.240* -0.197* -0.173* -0.111
(0.173) (0.084) (0.085) (0.071) (0.068)
Household Variables:
Ln Initial Income (Y0) -0.321 -0.133 -0.249 -0.024 -0.252
(0.938) (0.234) (0.278) (0.210) (0.185)
(Ln Y0)-Squared 0.014 0.009 0.028 -0.009 0.027
(0.149) (0.039) (0.046) (0.034) (0.030)
(Ln Y0)-Cubed 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.001
(0.008) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Household Education 8788 0.004* 0.002* 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log Family Size 0.013 0.011* 0.008* 0.005 0.000
(0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Dependency Ratio -0.041* 0.013 0.024* 0.029* 0.030*
(0.014) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Log Cultivated Land 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.002* 0.001
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age <= 30 -0.002 -0.011* -0.008* -0.006 -0.005
(0.009) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
31 <= Age <= 40 -0.024* -0.011* -0.007* -0.004* -0.004*
(0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
51 <= Age <= 60 0.002 -0.006 -0.009* -0.007* -0.010*
(0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age > 60 -0.035* -0.027* -0.018* -0.016* -0.019*
(0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Village Variables:
Log Mean Initial Income 0.023 0.026 0.034* 0.028* 0.017
(0.028) (0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.009)
Avg Education -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003
(0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Log Per Capita Land 0.033* 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.003
(0.015) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
Dependency Ratio -0.336* -0.109 -0.080 -0.120* -0.116*
(0.144) (0.066) (0.057) (0.044) (0.037)
Share of HH Income from Agriculture -0.063 0.035 0.015 0.058 0.045
(0.143) (0.052) (0.053) (0.049) (0.042)
Share of HH Income from Wages 0.047 0.068 0.019 0.057 0.024
(0.160) (0.054) (0.053) (0.050) (0.046)
Share of HH Income from Fam Business -0.004 0.059 0.020 0.093 0.045
(0.150) (0.067) (0.067) (0.057) (0.051)
Tax Revenue Per Capita -0.028 -0.001 -0.011 -0.005 -0.006
(0.056) (0.022) (0.020) (0.015) (0.015)
Gov Expenditure Per Capita 0.050 0.003 0.011 0.010 0.015
(0.061) (0.021) (0.020) (0.016) (0.017)
N 3424 3424 3424 3424 3424
Notes:
1) All specifications employ attrition weights;
2) Village mean log income and education are Jack-Knifed.
3) For further details, see the notes to Table 2
(Cluster-corrected Standard Errors in Parentheses)
APPENDIX TABLE 2
Additional Covariates (Corresponding to Table 2, Column 5)(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1989-90 1991-93 1995-96 1997-98 1999-00 2001-02
Beginning Period:
1987-88 -0.722* -0.221 -0.255* -0.234* -0.190* -0.132
(0.257) (0.137) (0.084) (0.089) (0.078) (0.080)
1989-90 -0.153 -0.090 -0.116 0.018 0.025
(0.214) (0.128) (0.092) (0.077) (0.063)
1991-93 0.126 0.099 0.108 0.128
(0.288) (0.201) (0.122) (0.097)






(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1989-90 1991-93 1995-96 1997-98 1999-00 2001-02
Beginning Period:
1987-88 -0.047* -0.015* -0.015* -0.015* -0.012* -0.009*
(0.014) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
1989-90 -0.004 -0.001 -0.005 0.001 0.000
(0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
1991-93 0.004 0.001 0.005 0.006
(0.012) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005)






2) The reported numbers are the coefficients (and standard errors) of the effect of inequality on growth from a 
regression of growth between period "t" and "t-1" as a function of village characteristics in period "t-1"
APPENDIX TABLE 3
Notes:
1) All specifications use the village-panel data set, cross-section specification
Measure of Inequality: Mean Log Deviation
Measure of Inequality: 90-10 Ratio
How does initial inequality relate to various subsequent growth rates?
Varying the Beginning and End Periods, Village-Level "Cross-Section" Specification
Endpoint Period:
Endpoint Period: